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This paper investigates the comparative statics of ”more ambiguity aversion”
as deﬁned by Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005). The analysis uses the
static two-asset portfolio problem with one safe asset and one uncertain one.
While it is intuitive that more ambiguity aversion would reduce demand for
the uncertain asset, this is not necessarily the case. We derive suﬃcient con-
ditions for a reduction in the demand for the uncertain asset, and for an
increase in the equity premium. An example which meets the suﬃcient con-
ditions is when the set of plausible distributions for returns on the uncertain
asset can be ranked accordi n gt ot h e i rm o n o t o n el i k elihood ratio. It is also
shown how ambiguity aversion distorts the price kernel in the alternative
portfolio problem with complete markets for contingent claims.
Keywords: Smooth ambiguity aversion, monotone likelihood ratio, eq-
uity premium, portfolio choice, price kernel, central dominance.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper examines the standard static portfolio problem with one safe asset
and one uncertain asset. For the investor, the true probability distribution
for the excess return on the uncertain asset is ambiguous. This ambiguity
is expressed by a second order prior probability distribution over the set of
plausible (ﬁrst order) distributions for the excess return. Following Segal
(1987) and Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) (hereafter KMM), an
investor’s attitude towards ambiguity is introduced by relaxing the reduc-
tion of ﬁrst and second order probabilities. In other words, the investor does
not evaluate in the same way lottery 1 yielding a payoﬀ  with probabil-
ity  and lottery 2 yielding the same payoﬀ  with an unknown probability
whose expectation is . This is in contrast to the standard Bayesian expected
utility framework under which the two lotteries would be evaluated identi-
cally. It is assumed that the investor is ambiguity averse if they dislike any
m e a n - p r e s e r v i n gs p r e a di nt h es p a c eo fﬁrst order probability distributions
for excess returns. For example, they prefer lottery 1 to lottery 2.
KMM propose a useful and elegant decision criterion called ”smooth am-
biguity aversion” that is compatible with ambiguity averse preferences under
uncertainty. For a given portfolio allocation, the ex ante welfare of the in-
vestor is measured by computing the (second order) expectation of a concave
function  of the (ﬁrst order) expected utility  of ﬁnal consumption con-
ditional on each plausible distribution for the excess return. As usual, the
concavity of the utility function  expresses risk aversion in the special case
of risky acts, i.e. acts for which the plausible probability distributions for
their consequences is unique. When  is linear, we are back to the standard
expected utility model. The representation of the uncertain context can be
reduced to a single compound probability distribution. However, when 
1is concave, the investor is ambiguity averse, and the reduction to a single
compound distribution is not valid.
KMM also deﬁne the comparative notion of ”more ambiguity aversion”.
Consider two agents, respectively with function 1 and 2,w h oh a v et h es a m e
beliefs expressed by the set of ﬁrst and second order probability distributions.
Suppose also that they have the same utility function  to evaluate risky acts.
Agent 2 is more ambiguity averse than agent 1 if 1 prefers an uncertain
a c to v e rap u r er i s k yo n ew h e n e v e r2 does so. This is true if and only
if function 2 is more concave than function 1,i nt h eA r r o w - P r a t ts e n s e :
−00
20
2 is uniformly larger than −00
10
1. This paper examines the eﬀect of
such an increase in ambiguity aversion on the optimal level of demand for the
uncertain asset. To do so, the ﬁrst and second order beliefs, and the utility
function  are ﬁxed.The eﬀect of a concave transformation of function  on
the optimal portfolio can then be examined.
The KMM model has two attractive features in comparison to other mod-
els of ambiguity such as the pioneering maxmin expected utility (or multiple-
prior) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). First, it creates a crisp sep-
aration between ambiguity aversion and ambiguity, i.e., between tastes and
beliefs. Without this feature, the comparative static analysis of more am-
biguity aversion could not be performed. Second, the KMM model applies
the expected utility machinery sequentially, starting on the ﬁrst order prob-
ability distributions before moving onto the second order distributions. This
allows the huge range of techniques amassed over the years to tackle ques-
tions involving risk under the expected utility framework to be applied to
the analysis of problems involving ambiguity aversion. A point illustrated by
this paper.
The question of the comparative statics of ambiguity aversion for the
portfolio problem is parallel to the one of risk aversion. It has been well
2established since Arrow (1963) and Pratt (1964) that an increase in risk
aversion reduces demand for the risky asset. It is therefore quite surprising
that in general, as shown in this paper, it is not necessarily true that more
ambiguity aversion reduces demand for an ambiguous asset. For a cleverly
chosen - but not spurious - set of priors for the return on the ambiguous
asset, it is shown that the introduction of ambiguity aversion increases the
investor’s demand. The intuition for why such counterexamples may exist
can be explained as follows. The ﬁrst-order condition of the portfolio prob-
lem with ambiguity aversion can be rewritten in the form that it takes under
the expected utility model, but with a distortion in the way the diﬀerent ﬁrst
order probability distributions for the excess return are compounded. Taking
the expected utility approach, i.e., ’ambiguity neutrality’, the compounding
is made by using the true second order probability distribution. Under am-
biguity aversion, this second order probability distribution is distorted by
putting more weight on the plausible second order distributions yielding a
smaller expected utility. This was ﬁrst observed by Taboga (2005). In spite
of the fact that the ambiguity averse investor’s beliefs cannot be reduced
to a single compound probability distribution over excess returns, the in-
troduction of ambiguity aversion is observationally equivalent to the eﬀect
of distorting the compound distribution used by the ambiguity-neutral in-
vestor. This distortion is pessimistic, in a technical sense that is deﬁned
more precisely in the paper. It is well known from expected utility theory
that pessimistic deteriorations in beliefs do not always reduce the demand for
the risky asset.1 As for Giﬀen goods in consumer theory, this deterioration
in the terms of trade yields a wealth eﬀect that may in fact raise demand.
The main objective of the paper is to characterize conditions under which
1See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), Fishburn and Porter (1976), Meyer and Ormiston
(1985), Hadar and Seo (1990), Gollier (1995), Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995), Abel (2002)
and Athey (2002), and the bibliographical references in these papers.
3more ambiguity aversion reduces the optimal level of exposure to uncertainty.
This can be done by restricting either the set of utility functions and/or the
set of possible priors. If it is assumed that the set of priors can be ranked
according to their order of ﬁrst-degree or second-degree stochastic dominance
(FSD/SSD), then some simple suﬃcient conditions on the utility function
result in unambiguous comparative static properties after the introduction
of ambiguity aversion.This is illustrated in the paper. These results are
derived by using the following technique. Any increase in ambiguity aversion
deteriorates the observationally equivalent second order distribution in a
very speciﬁc way. More weight is transferred onto the worst priors in the
sense of those with the lowest monotone likelihood ratio (MLR). This puts a
very speciﬁc structure on the notion of pessimism caused by more ambiguity
aversion. For example, if the plausible p r i o r sc a nber a n k e da c c o r d i n gt oF S D ,
then their compound MLR deteriorated second order probability distribution
generated by more ambiguity aversion implies a FSD deterioration of the
behaviorally equivalent changes of beliefs under expected utility. In turn this
implies that the following two questions are linked :
1) under the EU model, what are the conditions on the utility function
 that guarantee that any FSD deterioration in the distribution of excess
return of the risky asset reduces the demand for it?; and
2) in the KMM model, what are the conditions that guarantee that any
increase in ambiguity aversion reduces the demand for the ambiguous asset?
The same property holds when replacing FSD by SSD. More sophisti-
cated methods are required when considering other stochastic orders to rank
plausible priors for the excess return. The result which is easiest to express
should be mentioned at this stage: if the plausible priors can be ranked ac-
cording to MLR (a special case of FSD), then it is always true that more
ambiguity aversion reduces the demand for the ambiguous asset.
4It is easy to translate these results about the eﬀect of comparative am-
biguity aversion on the demand for the ambiguous asset into its eﬀect on
the equity premium. Therefore this work is related to recent research on the
eﬀect of ambiguity aversion on the equity premium.
Ju and Miao (2009) and Collard, Mukerji, Sheppard and Tallon (2009)
e x a m i n ead y n a m i ci n ﬁnite-horizon portfolio problem in which the represen-
tative investor exhibits smooth ambiguity aversion and faces time-varying
ambiguity about the second order distribution of the plausible probability
distributions of consumption growth. These two papers consider diﬀerent
sets of risk-ambiguity attitudes (), and diﬀerent stochastic processes for
the ﬁrst and second order probability distributions. They both use numeri-
cal analyses to solve the calibrated dynamic portfolio problem and they both
conclude that ambiguity aversion raises the equity premium. Other papers
draw a similar conclusion, but using other decision criterion for ambiguity
aversion, either maxmin expected utility, Choquet expected utility, or robust
control theory.2 This paper demonstrates that these results are speciﬁct o
the calibration under scrutiny.
The portfolio problem and two illustrations are presented in Section 2.
The main results are presented in Section 3 in which suﬃcient conditions
are derived for the comparative statics of more ambiguity aversion. Section
4 examines a Lucas economy with a representative agent facing ambiguous
state probabilities. It is shown how the ambiguity aversion of the represen-
tative agent aﬀects the equity premium, the price kernel of the economy, and
individual asset prices.
2See for example Dow and Werlang (1992), Chen and Epstein (2002), Epstein and
Wang (1994), Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini (1999), Maenhout (2004), Hansen and Sargent
(2008).
52 The smooth ambiguity model applied to
the portfolio problem
The model is static with two assets. The ﬁrst asset is safe with a rate of
return that is normalized to zero. The uncertain asset has a return  whose
distribution is ambiguous in the sense that it is sensitive to some parameter
 whose true value is unknown. The investor is initially endowed with wealth
0.I ft h e yi n v e s t in the uncertain asset, their ﬁnal wealth will be 0 +
conditional on a realized return  on the uncertain asset.
The ambiguity of the uncertain asset is characterized by a set Π =
{1} of plausible cumulative probability distributions for e .L e t e 
denote the random variable distributed as .I ti ss u p p o s e dt h a tt h es u p -
port of all priors are bounded in [− +] with −  0  + Based on
their subjective information, the investor associates a second order probabil-
ity distribution (1 )o v e rt h es e to fp r i o r sΠ with Σ
=1 =1  where
 ≥ 0 is the probability that  is the true probability distribution for ex-
cess returns.From now on e  denotes the random variable (1 1;2;2;;)
Following Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), it is assumed that the
investor’s preferences exhibit smooth ambiguity aversion. For each plausi-
ble probability distribution  the investor computes the expected utility
()=(0 + e )=
R
(0 + )() conditional on  being the
true distribution. It is assumed that  is increasing and concave, so that
() is concave in the level of investment  in the ambiguous asset, for
all . Ex ante, for a given portfolio allocation  the welfare of the agent is













((0 + e ))
!

 () can be interpreted as the certainty equivalent of the uncertain con-
6ditional expected utility ( e ). The shape of  describes the investor’s
attitude towards ambiguity. A linear  means that the investor has a neutral
attitude towards ambiguity, and that their compound probability distribu-
tions can be reduced to a single one Σ. In contrast, a concave  is
synonymous with ambiguity aversion in the sense that the DM dislikes any
mean-preserving spread of the conditional expected utility ( e ).
An interesting particular case arises when the absolute ambiguity aver-
sion ()=−00()0() is constant, so that ()=−−1 exp(−).
As proved by Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), the ex ante welfare
 () essentially exhibits a maxmin expected utility functional  ()=
min (0 + e )` a la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) when the degree  of
absolute ambiguity aversion tends to inﬁnity.
The optimal portfolio allocation ∗ maximizes the ex ante welfare of the







((0 + e )) (1)
If  and  are strictly concave, then the objective function is concave in  and
the solution to program (1), when it exists, is unique. It can be observed that
the demand for the ambiguous asset shares its sign with the equity premium
e  = Σe . All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Lemma 1 The demand for the ambiguous asset is positive (zero/negative)
if the equity premium is positive (zero/negative).
This means that ambiguity aversion, as is the case for risk aversion, has
a second order nature, as deﬁned by Segal and Spivak (1990). As soon
as the equity premium is positive, the demand for the ambiguous asset is
7positive, independent of the degree of ambiguity over the distribution of
returns. From now on it is assumed that the equity premium is positive, so
that ∗ is positive.
The remainder of this section, examines two illustrations. Consider ﬁrst
the following special case in which an analytical solution can be found for
∗:
• Priors are normally distributed with the same variance 2,a n dw i t h
e  =  : e  ∼ ();3
• The ambiguity over the equity premium  is itself normally distributed:
e  ∼ (0);
• The investor’s preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion: ()=
−−1 exp− ∈ R−;
• The investor’s preferences exhibit constant relative ambiguity aversion:
()=−(−)1+(1 + ) This function is increasing in R− and is
concave in this domain if  is positive.
As is well-known, the normality of the priors and the constancy of absolute
risk aversion implies that the Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact.4 This








Because () is an exponential function of ,a n de  is normally distributed,
therefore the same trick can be used to compute  yielding:
 ()=−





3It is easy to extend this to the case of an ambiguous variance.
4For a simple proof, see for example Gollier (2001, page 57).







It can be seen that under ambiguity (2
0  0), the demand for the uncer-
tain asset is decreasing in the relative degree  of ambiguity aversion of
the investor. This exponential-power speciﬁcation for ()d i ﬀers from the
other three papers on this topic. Taboga (2005) examines an exponential-
exponential speciﬁcation. Ju and Miao (2009) used a power-power speciﬁca-
tion, whereas Collard, Mukerji, Sheppard and Tallon (2009) used a power-
exponential speciﬁcation. None of these three alternative problems can be
solved analytically.
Alternatively, consider the following counterexample:
•  =2 ,e 1 ∼ (−1210;−025320;075720;125310) and e 2 ∼
(−115;015;135);
• 1 =5 %a n d2 =9 5 % ;
• ()=m i n ( 3+0 3( − 3)) and 0 =2 ;
• ()=−−1 exp(−).
It is easy to check that e 1 is riskier than e 2 in the sense of Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970) sense. The problem is solved numerically. Below a minimum
threshold of around 20 for the degree  of ambiguity aversion, the optimal
holding of the ambiguous asset equals ∗ = 1. However, above this threshold
the introduction of ambiguity aversion increases ∗ above the optimal invest-
ment of the ambiguity-neutral investor. For example, ∗ equals 1204 when
 =5 0  When  tends to inﬁnity, the optimal investment in the uncertain
asset tends to ∗ =4 3 which is the optimal holding of the ambiguous as-
set for an ambiguity-neutral investor who believes that the distribution of
9excess return is e 1 with certainty. In terms of portfolio allocation, it is ob-
servationally equivalent to increase absolute ambiguity aversion from zero to
inﬁnity or to replace beliefs e 1 ∼ (e 15%;e 295%) by e 2 ∼ (e 1100%) under
expected utility. Notice that because e 1 is riskier than e 2, the extreme be-
lief e 2 is riskier than e 1 in the Rothschild and Stiglitz sense. This example
illustrates the fact — ﬁrst observed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) — that
it is not true in general that a riskier distribution for excess returns reduces
the demand for the risky asset in the expected utility model.
3E ﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s eo fa m b i g u i t ya v e r s i o n
The investor’s beliefs are represented by the set of priors (e 1e )f o rt h e
excess return of the uncertain asset, together with the second order distrib-
ution (1) on these priors. A comparison is made between two agents
with the same beliefs and the same concave utility function  but with dif-
ferent attitudes toward ambiguity represented by the concave functions 1
and 2. The demand for the uncertain asset by agent 1 is expressed by ∗
1










1e )=0  (5)
Following Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), it is assumed that the
agent with function 2 is more ambiguity averse than agent 1 in the sense
that there exists an increasing and concave transformation function  such
that 2()=(1()) for all  in the relevant domain. We would like to
characterize the conditions under which the more ambiguity averse agent 2
has a smaller demand for the uncertain asset than agent 1: ∗
2 ≤ ∗
1.T h i s










1e ) ≤ 0 (6)
The conditions under which it is always true that (5) implies (6) are sought.




1e 1)=0 = ⇒ e 2
0(0 + 
∗
1e 2) ≤ 0 (7)
where e  is a compound random variable which equals e  with probability
b 












Notice that the left equality on the left in (7) can be interpreted as the ﬁrst-
order condition of the problem max (0 + e 1) for an expected-utility-
maximizing investor whose beliefs are represented by e 1 ∼ (e 1 b 1
1;;e  b 1
).
Therefore, the ambiguity averse agent 1 behaves in the same way as an EU-
maximizing agent who has distorted their second order beliefs from (1 )
to the ”observationally equivalent probability distribution” b 1 =( b 1
1 b 1
).




1)) is a Radon-Nikodym deriv-
ative, and the probability distribution b 1 is analogous to the risk-neutral
probability distribution used in the theory of ﬁnance. Notice that the distor-
tion functional described by equation (8) is endogenous, because it depends
upon the portfolio allocation ∗
1 selected by the agent. The inequality on
the right in (7) just means that shifting beliefs from e 1 to e 2 reduces the
ambiguity-neutral investor’s holding of the asset. These ﬁndings are summa-
rized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 The change in preferences from (1) to (2) reduces the de-
mand for the ambiguous asset if the EU agent with utility function  reduces
11their demand for the uncertain asset when their beliefs about the excess re-
turn shift from e 1 ∼ (e 1 b 1
1;;e  b 1
) to e 2 ∼ (e 1 b 2
1;;e  b 2
), where b 
 is
deﬁn e db y( 8 ) .
This result was initially due to Taboga (2005). It precisely expresses
the observational equivalence property that has already been encountered in
the counterexample presented in the previous section. It provides a test to
determine whether more ambiguity aversion reduces demand. Observe that
this test relies on two reduced probability distribution e 1 and e 2.H o w e v e r ,i t
is not true that the ambiguity averse investor (1) uses the corresponding
reduced probability distribution e 1 to evaluate the optimality of the diﬀerent
feasible portfolios. If they did so, they would re-evaluate the distribution of e 1
for each portfolio, since vector b 1 is a function of . In the smooth ambiguity
aversion model, beliefs cannot be reduced to a single probability distribution
over the payoﬀs for each state of the world. However, this lemma builds a
bridge between the comparative statics of increased ambiguity aversion and
increases in risk in the classical EU model.
Let us now examine how changing function 1 into 2 modiﬁes the obser-
vationally equivalent probability distribution for the excess return. A ﬁrst
answer to this question is provided by the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The following two conditions are equivalent:
1. Agent 2 is more ambiguity averse than agent 1;
2. Beliefs b 2 are dominated by b 1 in the sense of their monotone likelihood
ratio order.






 is decreasing in . An increase in ambiguity aversion has
12an eﬀect on demand that is observationally equivalent to a MLR-dominated
shift in the prior beliefs. In other words, it distorts beliefs by favouring the
worst priors in a very speciﬁcs e n s e :i fa g e n t1 prefers prior e  over prior
e 0 then, compared to agent 1 t h em o r ea m b i g u i t ya v e r s ea g e n t2 in-
creases the distorted probability b 2
0 relatively more than the probability b 2
.
Lemma 3 provides a justiﬁcation for saying that, in the case of the portfo-
lio problem, more ambiguity aversion is observationally equivalent to more
pessimism, i.e., to a MLR deterioration of beliefs. This result is central
to proving the next proposition, in which three dominance orders are con-
sidered: ﬁrst degree stochastic dominance (FSD), second-degree stochastic
dominance (SSD), and Rothschild and Stiglitz’s increase in risk (IR).
Proposition 1 Let  be one of the following stochastic orders: FSD, SSD
or IR. Suppose that e 0,a n dt h a t(e 1e ) can be ranked according to
the stochastic order  . If there is a concave function  such that 2 = (1)
and if e 1 ¹ e 2 ¹  ¹ e  then
e 2 ∼ (e 1 b 
2
1;;e  b 
2
) ¹ (e 1 b 
1
1;;e  b 
1
) ∼ e 1
In words, if (e 1e ) can be ranked according to the stochastic order
 , then an increase in ambiguity aversion deteriorates the observationally
equivalent probability distribution for the excess return in the sense of the
stochastic order  Therefore, if priors can be ranked according to ﬁrst-
degree stochastic dominance, the increase in ambiguity aversion modiﬁes
the demand for the asset in the same direction as an FSD deterioration of
the excess return in the expected utility model. The problem is that, in
general, the comparative statics of an FSD deterioration in the excess return
is ambiguous in the expected utility model. The intuition for this negative
result is that a reduction in the return on an asset has a substitution eﬀect and
aw e a l t he ﬀect. As for the existence of Giﬀen goods in consumption theory,
13the wealth eﬀect may induce an increase in the asset demand. Technically,
it is not true in general that condition (7) holds when e 2 ¹ e 1 It is
easy to see why: by the deﬁnition of FSD, this would be true if and only if
function ()=0(0 + ) was increasing, which is not true in general.
As observed by Fishburn and Porter (1976), a suﬃcient condition for  to
be increasing is that relative risk aversion ()=−00()0() is smaller
than unity.5 By implication, this is also a suﬃcient condition for an increase
in ambiguity aversion to reduce the demand for the ambiguous asset when
p r i o r sc a nb er a n k e da c c o r d i n gt oF S D .
T h es a m es t r a t e g yc a nb eu s e dt oe x a m i n et h ec a s ew h e np r i o r sc a nb e
ranked in the sense of a Rothschild-Stiglitz increase in risk. In that case,
the above proposition tells us that the observationally equivalent probability
distribution e 2 is an increase in risk compared to e 1. This does not in general
imply that condition (7) holds because  is not necessarily concave. As
initially shown by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), it is not true in general that
an increase in risk for the excess return of the risky asset reduces its demand.
Hadar and Seo (1990) provided a suﬃcient condition, which guarantees that 
is concave. This condition is that relative prudence is positive and less than
2 ,w h e r er e l a t i v ep r u d e n c ei sd e ﬁned by ()=−000()00()( K i m b a l l
(1990)) This proves the following result:
Proposition 2 Suppose that  ∈ 3 and e 0. Any increase in ambiguity
aversion reduces the demand for the uncertain asset if one of the following
two conditions is satisﬁed:
1. (e 1e ) can be ranked according ﬁrst-degree stochastic dominance
and  ≤ 1;
5with ()=−00()0().
142. (e 1e ) can be ranked according to the Rothschild and Stiglitz’s risk-
iness order and 0 ≤  ≤ 2.
More generally, if the set of marginals can be ranked according to the SSD
order, an increase in ambiguity aversion reduces the demand for the risky as-
set if relative risk aversion is less than unity, and relative prudence is positive
and less than two. In the case of power utility function, relative prudence
equals relative risk aversion plus one. This implies that when relative risk
aversion is constant, and when priors can be ranked according to SSD, any
increase in ambiguity aversion reduces the demand for the ambiguous asset if
relative risk aversion is less than unity. This condition is not very convincing,
since relative risk aversion is usually assumed to be larger than unity. Argu-
ments have been provided based on introspection (Dr` eze (1981), Kandel and
Stambaugh (1991), Gollier (2001)) or on the equity premium puzzle that can
be solved in the canonical model only with a degree of relative risk aversion
exceeding 40.
Rather than limiting the set of utility functions yielding an unambiguous
eﬀect, an alternative approach is to restrict the set of priors. To do this, let
us ﬁrst introduce the following concepts, which rely on the location-weighted-





Following Gollier (1995), it can be said that e 2 is dominated by e 1 in the
sense of Central Dominance if there exists a nonnegative scalar  such that
2() ≤ 1() for all  ∈ [− +]6 Gollier (1995) showed that e 2 ¹ e 1
6There is no simple interpretation of this stochastic order in the literature. However,
observe that replacing e 1 by e 2 ∼ (e 1;01 − )i m p l i e st h a t2 = 1. This pro-
portional probability transfer to the zero excess return has no eﬀect on the risk-averse
investor’s demand for the risky asset. This explains the presence of the arbitrary scalar
15is necessary and suﬃcient to guarantee that all risk-averse investors reduce
their demand for the risky asset whose distribution for excess returns goes
from e 1 to e 2. SSD-dominance is not suﬃcient for CD-dominance. Notice
that e 1 and e 2 in the counterexample of the previous section violate the CD
condition. It implies that there exists a concave utility function such that
the demand for the asset is increased when beliefs go from (e 15%;e 295%)
to the riskier e 1
Here is a partial list of stochastic orders that have been shown to belong
to the wide set of CD:
• Monotone Likelihood Ratio order (MLR) (Ormiston and Schlee (1993)).
Notice that MLR is a subset of FSD.
• Strong Increase in Risk (Meyer and Ormiston (1985)): The excess re-
turn e 2 is a strong increase in risk with respect to e 1 if they have the
same mean and if any probability mass taken out of some of the real-
izations of e 1 is transferred out of the support of this random variable.
• Simple Increase in Risk (Dionne and Gollier (1992)): Random variable
e 2 is a simple increase in risk with respect to e 1 if they have the same
mean and (1() − 2()) is nonnegative for all .
• Monotone Probability Ratio order (MPR) (Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995),
Athey (2002)): When the two random variables have the same support,
i tc a nb es a i dt h a te 2 is dominated by e 1 in the sense of MPR if the
cumulative probability ratio 2()1()i sn o n i n c r e a s i n g . I tc a nb e
 in the deﬁnition of CD. Moreover a CD shift with  = 1 requires a reduction of the
location-weighted-probability function . For example, if one divides a probability mass
 at some return  = 0i nt w oe q u a lm a s s e s( 22), the transfer of mass to the left
must be to the left of 2, which is a strong condition.
16shown that MPR is more general than MLR, but is still a subset of
FSD
The next result allows the conditions on  to be relaxed, but at the cost
of restricting the set of priors.
Proposition 3 Suppose that e 0. Any increase in ambiguity aversion
reduces the demand for the uncertain asset if the set of priors (e 1e )
can be ranked according to both SSD dominance and central dominance, that
is, if e  ¹ e +1 and e  ¹ e +1 for all  =1  − 1
To illustrate, because it is known that MLR yields both ﬁrst-degree sto-
chastic dominance and central dominance, the following corollary is obtained
directly:
Corollary 1 Suppose that e 0 and that (e 1e ) can be ranked accord-
ing to the monotone likelihood ratio order. Then, any increase in ambiguity
aversion reduces the demand for the uncertain asset.
In this case, it can be concluded that ambiguity aversion and risk aversion
work in the same direction. A more general corollary holds when the MLR
order is replaced by the more general MPR order.
It is noteworthy that the comparative statics of ambiguity aversion are
much simpler when considering market participation. Of course, as observed
in Lemma 1, the basic model is not well suited to examining this question,
since all agents should have a positive demand for equity as soon as the
equity premium is positive (second order risk aversion). Let us introduce a
ﬁxed cost  for market participation, so that the new model is with ()=
(0 −  + e )()=−1 (
P
 (())) − →  =a r gm a x (), and
∗ = − →  if  (− →  ) ≥ (0), and ∗ = 0 otherwise. Obviously, because 
17is the certainty equivalent of ( e ) under function ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
concavity of  reduces  () for all  Therefore the condition for market
participation  (− →  ) ≥ (0) is less likely to hold when ambiguity aversion
is increased. This means that ambiguity aversion may explain the market
participation puzzle (Haliassos and Bertaut (1995)).7
4 A s s e tp r i c e sw i t hc o m p l e t em a r k e t s
This section extends the focus of our analysis to the eﬀect of ambiguity
aversion on the price of contingent claims. Consider a Lucas tree economy
with identical risk-averse and ambiguity averse representative agents whose
preferences are characterized by increasing and concave functions ().
Each agent is endowed with a tree producing an uncertain quantity of fruit at
t h ee n do ft h ep e r i o d .T h e r ea r e possible states of nature, with  denoting
the number of fruits produced by the trees in state ,  =1 .T h e
distribution of states is subject to some parametric uncertainty. Parameter 
can take value 1 with probabilities (1), and | is the probability
of state  conditional on .L e t  = Σ| denote the unconditional
probability of state . Ex ante, there is a market for contingent claims.
Agents trade claims for fruit contingent on the harvest. Assuming complete
markets, the ambiguity averse and risk-averse agent, whose preferences are














Π( − )=0 
(10)
where  −  is the demand for the Arrow-Debreu security associated with
state ,a n dΠ is the price of that contingent claim. The ﬁrst-order conditions
7Thus, our story of the role ambiguity aversion in explaining the market participation
puzzle diﬀers from the one by Dow and Werlang (1992) and Epstein and Schneider (2007),
who consider a MEU model without participation cost.

















for all  where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget
constraint. The market-clearing conditions impose that  =  for all ,
which implies the following equilibrium state prices:
Π





for all , where the distorted state probability b 

















where e  is distributed as (1 1|; |) Under ambiguity neutrality, it
follows that b 
 =  and b 
 is the true probability of state  computed from
the compound ﬁrst and second order probabilities. The aversion to ambiguity
of the representative agent aﬀects prices in the equilibrium state in a way
that is observationally equivalent to a distortion of beliefs in the EU model.
This distortion takes the form of a transformation of the subjective prior
distribution from (1)t o( b 
1 b 
)t h a ti se q u i v a l e n tt ot h ep r e v i o u s
section with e  = 0 +∗
1e .L e m m a3i m p l i e st h a tb 2 is dominated by b 1 in
the sense of MLR when 2 is more ambiguity averse than agent 1 The next
proposition is a direct consequence of this observation.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the set of priors (e 1e ) c a nb er a n k e da c -
cording to the stochastic order  ( =F S D ,S S D o rI R ).I ft h e r ei sa
concave  such that 2 = (1) and if e 1 ¹ e 2 ¹  ¹ e  ,t h e n
(e 1 b 2
1;;e  b 2
) ¹ (e 1 b 1
1;;e  b 1
)
19It is straightforward to reinterpret this result in terms of the impact of
ambiguity aversion on the price kernel  = Π.S u p p o s e t h a t  6= 0
for all (0), so that index  =1  can be substituted by another index
 = 1. Figure 1 draws the state price  = b 
0() as a function
of . Under ambiguity neutrality, this is a decreasing function, because 0 is
decreasing. The slope of the curve () describes the degree of risk aversion
of the agent. From Proposition 4, ambiguity aversion tends to reinforce risk
aversion. Indeed, if the priors can be ranked by FSD, an increase in ambiguity
aversion has an eﬀect on asset prices that is observationally equivalent to a
FSD-deteriorating shift in beliefs, that is it tends to transfer the distorted
probability mass b  from the good states to the bad ones. The corresponding
shift in  = b 0() is described in Figure 1a. If the priors can be
ranked according to their riskiness, an increase in ambiguity aversion tends
to transfer the distorted probability mass to the extreme states. This implies
convexifying the price kernel in the region of aggregate consumption where
priors diﬀer by mean-preserving spreads, as depicted in Figure 1b.
In the standard EU model, there is a decreasing relationship between the
pricing kernel and aggregate consumption. However, there is some strong em-
pirical evidence that this relation may be violated (Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000),
Rosenberg and Engle (2002), Yatchew and H¨ ardle (2006), and Barone-Adesi
and Dall’O (2009)). Typically, the empirical pricing kernel is ”bump-shaped”,
as in Figure 2. Hens and Reichlin (2010) provide three plausible stories to ex-
plain this ”pricing kernel puzzle” : incomplete markets, risk-seeking behavior,
and heterogeneous beliefs. This paper shows that ambiguity and ambiguity
aversion are another plausible solution for this puzzle. This can be seen from
Figure 1b, where the priors diﬀer by a mean-preserving spread in the lower
tail of the distribution. To illustrate, let us consider a four-state economy






a : FSD                                                                   b : IR 

Figure 1: The eﬀect of an increase in ambiguity aversion on the price kernel,
when the priors can be ranked by the FSD order (a), or by the Rothschild-
Stiglitz riskiness order (b).
two equally plausible distributions for the state probabilities. The two proba-
bility distributions are respectively (18121814) and (3803814)
It is easy to check that the second distribution is riskier than the ﬁrst in
the Rothschild-Stiglitz sense. Let us also assume that 0()=−2,a n d
0()=e x p ( −). The circled points in Figure 2 correspond to the pricing
kernel when the representative agent is ambiguity-neutral ( =0 )  whereas
the squared points correspond to the case of ambiguity aversion with  =5 0 
Using Proposition 4, many other distortions of the pricing kernel can be
obtained by considering other sets of multiple priors.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper explores the determinants of the demand for uncertain assets and
of asset prices when investors are ambiguity averse. The analysis was carried
out using the standard static portfolio problem with one safe asset and one
21Figure 2: The eﬀect of ambiguity aversion on the pricing kernel when priors
diﬀer by mean-preserving spreads in the lower tail of the distribution. The
dashed curve corresponds to ambiguity neutrality. The four state prices are
linked by quadratic interpolation.
22uncertain asset. It was shown that, contrary to casual intuition, ambiguity
aversion may yield an increase in demand for the risky and ambiguous asset,
and a reduction in the demand for the safe one. In the same fashion, it is
not necessarily true that ambiguity aversion raises the equity premium in
the economy. It was shown ﬁrst that the qualitative eﬀect of an increase
in ambiguity aversion in these settings is observationally equivalent to that
of a shift in the beliefs of the investor in the standard EU model. If the
set of plausible priors can be ranked according to the ﬁrst degree stochastic
dominance order, this shift is ﬁrst degree stochastic deteriorating, whereas it
is risk-increasing if these priors can be ranked according to the Rothschild-
Stiglitz risk order. The problem originates from the observation already
made by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) and Fishburn and Porter (1976)
that a FSD/SSD deteriorating shift in the distribution for the return of the
uncertain asset has an ambiguous eﬀect on the demand for that asset in
the EU framework. The literature that emerged from this negative result
has been heavily relied upon to provide some suﬃcient conditions for any
increase in ambiguity aversion to yield a reduction in the demand for the
uncertain asset and therefore an increase in the equity premium. In most
cases these conditions hold.
Two sets of ﬁndings conﬁrm this view. First, the numerical analyses in
the existing literature all show more ambiguity aversion reducing demand
for the uncertain asset. It has also been shown that this will always be
true when the ﬁrst and second order probability distributions are normal,
and the pair () are exponential-power functions. Second, the suﬃcient
conditions cover a wide set of realistic situations. For example, if the set
of priors can be ranked according to the well-known monotone likelihood
ratio order, then it is always true that an increase in ambiguity aversion
raises the equity premium. The conclusion is that the potential existence
23of a counterintuitive demand eﬀect arising from ambiguity aversion plays a
role similar to the potential existence of Giﬀen goods in consumption theory.
The observationally equivalent FSD deterioration of more ambiguity aversion
has a wealth eﬀect on the demand for the asset that may dominate the
substitution eﬀect. This is a rare event, but theoretical progress can rarely
be made without understanding the mechanism that generates it. After all,
the existence of Giﬀen goods is taught in Microeconomics 101.
24Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
By concavity of the objective function in (1) with respect to ,w eh a v e
that ∗ is positive if the derivative of this objective function with respect to








where e  = Σ is the equity premium. This concludes the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a3
Because 1 and 2 are increasing in  there exists an increasing function
 such that 2()=(1()) or 0
2()=0(1())0
1() for all .U s i n g


















for all  =1 . The Lemma is a direct consequence of (14), in the sense
that the likelihood ratio b 2
b 1
 is decreasing in  if 0 is decreasing in 1. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1




1). We have to prove that (e 1 b 1
1;;e  b 1
) is preferred to
(e 1 b 2
1;;e  b 2











where  is the set of increasing functions if =FSD,  is the set of increasing
and concave functions if =SSD, and  is the set of concave functions if
=IR. Combining the conditions that e  ¹ e +1 and that  ∈  implies
25that (e )i si n c r e a s i n gi n. The above inequality is obtained by combining
this property with the fact that b 2 is dominated by b 1 in the sense of MLR
(Lemma 3), a special case of FSD. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3




 is the maximand of (0 + e ).
Lemma 4 Consider a speciﬁc set of priors (e 1e ) and a concave utility
function . They characterize function  deﬁned by ()=(0 +
e ). Consider a speciﬁcs c a l a r∗
1 in . The following two conditions are
equivalent:
1. Any agent 2 that is more ambiguity averse than agent 1 with demand
∗
1 for the ambiguous asset will have a demand for it that is smaller
than ∗
1;









1)( 1 5 )
for all  ∈ {1}
Proof: We ﬁrst prove that condition 2 implies condition 1. Consider an
agent 2 = (1)t h a ti sm o r ea m b i g u i t ya v e r s et h a na g e n t1 so that the












for all . Multiplying both side of this inequality by 0
1((∗
1)) ≥ 0a n d






















26The last equality comes from the assumption that agent 1 selects portfolio
∗
1. Thus, condition (6) is satisﬁed, thereby implying that ∗
2 is less than ∗
1
We then prove that condition 1 implies condition 2. Without loss of
generality, rank the ss u c ht h a t(∗
1)i si n c r e a s i n gi n. By contradiction,
suppose that there exists a 0 such that (∗
1 0) ≥ 0a n d(∗
1 0 +
1) ≤ 0. Select a prior distribution (1)s ot h a t =0f o ra l l except











1 0 +1 ) ) (
∗
1 0 +1 )=0 
(16)
so that agent 1 selects portfolio ∗
1. Consider any concave transformation



























1 0 +1 ) ) (
∗
1 0 +1 ) 
Because (∗
1 0+1)≤ 0a n d0(1((∗
















1 0 +1 ) ) (
∗
1 0 +1 ) ]=0 
It implies that condition (6) is violated, implying in turn that ∗
2 is larger
than ∗
1 a contradiction. ¥
If we rank the  in such a way that (∗
1) is monotone in  condition
2 is essentially a single-crossing property of function (∗
1) To illustrate,
suppose that ()=−−1 exp(−)a n de  ∼ (2), which implies that
()i si n c r e a s i n gi n and is given by equation (2). It implies that ()
has the same sign as −2. It implies in turn that condition 2 in Lemma
4i ss a t i s ﬁed with  = 2. Our Lemma implies that ambiguity aversion
27reduces the demand for the uncertain asset in the exponential/normal case.
This was shown in Section 2 in the special case of power  functions.
We need to prove a second lemma in order to prepare for the proof of
Proposition 3.
Lemma 5 Suppose that e 2 is centrally dominated by e 1. Then, e 20(0 +
e 2) ≤ 0 for any  ≥ 0 such that e 10(0 + e 1) ≤ 0 .
Proof: By assumption, there exists a positive scalar  such that 2() ≤
1(). Integrating by part, we have that
e 2














0(0 + e 2) ≤ 
∙









0(0 + e 1)
B ya s s u m p t i o n ,t h i si sn o n p o s i t i v e .¥
We can now prove Proposition 3. Condition e  ¹ e +1 implies that
( +1)≥ (), whereas, by Lemma 5, condition e  ¹ e +1 implies
that () ≤ 0w h e n e v e r( +1 )≤ 0 This latter result implies that
there exists a  such that ( − )() ≤ 0 for all .T h i s i m m e d i a t e l y
yields condition 2 in Lemma 4, which is suﬃc i e n tf o ro u rc o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c
property. ¥
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